Authoritarianism and The PNDC Power Struggle in The Ruling Coalition

Saturday, 20 August 2011 09:30

Written by ghanapolitics.net

In his book entitled Staying Poor: Ghana's Political Economy, 1950-1990, Douglas Rimmer observes that the radical left, including the militant sections of students, workers, soldiers as well as organized movements, such as the June Fourth Movement (JFM), the New Democratic Movement (NDM), the Kwame Nkrumah Revolutionary Guards KNRG), and the African Youth Movement (AYM), ascribed poor economic conditions in Ghana to exploitation by foreign capitalists who have been assisted by a "comprador bourgeoisie." He asserts that they prefer direct national control of economic activities rather than Ghana's integration into an international market. During the mid-1980s, the general principle of the agreements with the IMF, as orchestrated by Kwesi Botchwey, Minister of Finance under the PNDC regime, was supported by the pro-IMF bureaucracy and some in the NDM.33

However, there was simple resistance to the adjustment program from some factions in the SOEs, revolutionary organizations, or "people's power," and some grassroots political organizations that tried to undermine the state structure. Hutchful (1989) asserts that those forces were unpredictable and not easily subject to control. The state bureaucracy, he continues, attacked this problem from two fronts: (1) It looked for allies who could re-introduce "discipline" and help arrest anarchistic developments, and (2) it hoped to use the agreement with international financial institutions (IFNs) to control labor movements. The major opposition to any form of collaboration with IFNs came surprisingly from the leftists faction supported by nationalist intellectuals and workers' organizations.34 Jeong (1995) states that the opposition proposed a self-reliance policy based on popular mobilization and looked for economic assistance from specialist countries. The position of the anti-IMF faction, however, was weakened by the failure to obtain aid from alternative sources, he concludes.35
Overall, implementation of the ERP in the 1980s and the political pressure from donor agencies resulted in the disorganization and defeat of the progressive groups who were subsequently driven to the fringes of power. Aside from the fact that the PNDC survived many coup attempts after introducing the ERP, there was a lot of opposition to the regime from other organized groups that had strong ties to students and labor that vehemently denounced Rawlings and his government's close ties to IFNs. The initial response to this opposition was PNDC's repression of public discussion of adjustment measures and criticisms of the government through the use of draconian means such as outlawing or restricting strikes, stopping mass protests and demonstrations, and the use of force by the state. This lack of representative institutions was sustained until the elections for district assemblies held in 1988. Even after the 1992 national elections the atmosphere was not congenial enough to provide a suitable milieu for wider political participation. Consequently the political legitimacy of the Rawlings government, despite a competitive multiparty election, had a cloud hanging over it because of the prior repression of labor unions and lack of public discourse of government policies.

In terms of repression of popular movements, Callaghy (1990) observes that government officials were most worried that political instability following resistance from key opposition groups could have a devastating impact on the remarkably sustained efforts of the ERP.36 Workers were seen as a major concern to the PNDC regime since they could disrupt the economy. Thus, since the inception of the ERP, Rawlings had attempted with some success, to reduce the economic and political power of workers; and while often stressing the need for discipline and productivity, the government had often railed against labor unions' demands for wage increases.

The PNDC, says Graham (1989), depended on "moral exhortation" and a subtle campaign depicting some workers as "self-interested". In some speeches, Rawlings often stressed "productivity," "discipline," and "hard work," as the tools needed by Ghanaians to reverse the economic crisis. The press, under the influence of the government, praised farmers for their contribution to the nation, while at the same time urging workers to restrain their demands; when they are not being described as unproductive, says Graham.37 Opponents of popular movements were appointed to high office, and as their influence grew, there was a marked alienation of popular forces, including the working class from the regime.

Without any doubt, labor agitations and unrests were often met by severe repression, as it happened on many occasions during this period when government used military and police forces, for example, against workers in disputes at Assene factory in Accra and the striking mine workers of the State Gold Mining Corporation at Dunkwa, according to Ninsin (1989).38 Graham (1989) states that the growing gap between the PNDC regime and labor was more dramatically represented in the four-month battle that erupted in April at the Pioneer Food Company in Tema. The labor struggle and the brutal repression by the police demonstrated the regime's growing hostility to the working class, and eventually reflected the evolving changes in the government's policy toward industrial relations, he concludes.39 It would not be far-fetched to assert that the PNDC changed to its role of repressing labor movements in order for it not only to implement donors' policies, but also to ensure that industrial relations would not stand in the way of its neo-classical economic reform. This political and ultimately ideological shift exemplified the direction chosen by the PNDC regime to pursue the ERP; that is, authoritarian rule that not only repressed but stifled participation in the political system.

Shaw (1993) observes that in order for the PNDC to build a new support base it had to resort to the politics of capacity mobilization and formal representation. The dilemma for the regime, however, was that the major beneficiaries of the ERP - expatriate businessmen and cocoa farmers - proved difficult to mobilize for support. First, the success of foreign businesses in Ghana, at the supposed expense of local ones, has been embarrassing for the government especially with ERP. Second, cocoa farmers represented a weak interest group that could not be counted for any kind of political mobilization if the need arose. Consequently, the regime was at a loss when it came time to find allies to build rural support for its policies and mobilization for formal representation.40

In order to overcome the dilemmas of broadening its political base, the regime reached out to a diverse group composed of lawyers, professionals, and the 31st December Women's Movement - the most prominent women's group in Ghana, to show its inclusiveness in Ghanaian politics and decision making. The courting of local chiefs and members of the clergy was seen by many as a last ditch effort to garner rural support by the PNDC regime. Krause (1987) asserts that Rawlings saw the traditional chiefs as "instruments of stability" and "linkage with the rural population," and the only ones able to overcome populist resistance and reduce anti-government sentiment. The clergy, on the other hand, were seen as capable of swaying the beliefs of their own followers through religious injunctions and moral suasions, and they fulfilled their role to the delight of the regime.41

Another aspect of the political hurdle for the Rawlings regime was how to balance ethnicity and political and economic outcomes in Ghana. Jeffries and Thomas (1993) observe that the political economy of distribution in Ghana has been based on regional as well as class relations, and essentially, ethnicity has affected the support base of economic policies through these patronage relationships.42 In terms of the ERP, Green (1987) states that it was positively received in the main cocoa growing regions, such as Ashanti and Brong Ahafo, which had suffered from previous government policies due to over-taxation and underpayment of cocoa producers. The PNDC's economic policies have been unpopular in the Accra region, including Sekondi and Takoradi, with its large number of organized labor and business and professional groups that resisted the authoritarian regime at every opportunity, he concludes.43 To address the question of ethnic diversity for the government, Rawlings reached out to many ethnic constituencies, including the Ewes, Adangbes, Ashantis, and Brongs. Mikell (1989) says that since effective political control in Ghana necessitates broad support and policies separated from ethnic, regional or economic favoritism, Rawlings attempted to build ethnic cooperation by emphasizing the irrelevance of ethnicity in constructing a strong Ghana; and, to some extent, he succeeded in doing just that.44 In1987, in its effort to create political reconciliation, the regime introduced the Program of Action to Mitigate the Social Costs of Adjustment (PAMSCAD).

To many in Ghana, this conciliatory stance was seen as well timed, especially as the government announced decisions to increase social spending for low-income classes before the local district elections in 1988 and the presidential elections in 1992. The PAMSCAD was designed to ease resistance of workers who believed that they have shouldered a disproportionate share of the cost of adjustment. Callaghy (1990) asserts that as the regime faced difficult challenges following several monetary and institutional reforms, the program attempted to prevent worsening economic conditions of retrenched workers and the poor. The PAMSCAD, he concludes, was a result of external donors and the government to gain political support for more reforms.45 There were two reasons for this course of action. The donors reasoned that this would sustain the Ghanaian experiment at structural adjustment, setting an example for the rest of Africa where SAPs were under attack.

The PAMSCAD was an important political test, not just for the Rawlings regime, whose adherence to World Bank/IMF- backed programs caused much political grief, but also for the external donors, who attracted much criticism in Ghana, in addition to the risk of nurturing the seeds of political resentment whenever SAPs are concerned. It was no coincidence that Ghana, one of very few African countries to follow the World Bank/IMF programs closely, would be the first subject of political resentment. The PAMSCAD offered an opportunity for the government to legitimize its economic programs.46

In the 1990s, the efforts of the international donor community gradually moved toward political reform as well as economic liberalization. Jeong (1995) observes that the pressure for a pluralistic system was based on the confidence that Ghana has overcome difficulties caused by economic stabilization, and that the slow progress in institutional reform has led to recognition of the necessity for a political system that is more susceptible to World Bank/IMF policy.47